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The Changes that. have occurred in the 
Industrial, Development Strategy i_n the 1JSSR
Over the Past Si.xty Years
. by s>
A„S. Manyara
Industrial development in the USSR since the 1920’s has involved not only large
scale expansion of output but also major changes in the location- of industry,
including its development in areas where it was previously non-existent.
After much of the political and military upheaval of the Revolution had, ended in 
1920 Lenin initiated the New Economic Policy (NEP) to rehabilitate the .economy 
of the country. From about '1921 through 1928 much of the industrial management 
was turned back to many of the original owners to operate on a semi-capitalist, 
basis in order .to effect a rapid improvement in economic conditions. Although 
the central government retained-control of banks and all financial, arrangements,, 
the economy was much more free to operate on its own than it had been during the 
period 1917-1920. 'l '
' '»
Under the private initiative allowed during the 1920’s, the economy was re­
established to the level that it had been in 1913. Only after this period of 
reconstruction did Stalin, Lenin-’s successor, . institute his famous Five-Year 
Plans,which were conceived to re-establish complete central control and to 
effect a rapid industrialisation. At the .time of the Revolution much of the 
industrial production of the,Soviet Union was concentrated in the European’ part y 
of the country. The Central Industrial Region accounted for 807. of -the textile
industry, while Ukraine" and Donets Basin accounted for over 90% of coal prod- . { 
uction, almost all the iron-ore production.and nearly 75% of pig iron prod­
uction. ■ . ‘ ■
Communist ideology adopted by the Soviets did not approve of such an uneven 
distribution of industrial development. Desire for industrial expansion was 
sounded in Stalin’s words in 1928; "In order to achieve the final. victory of 
Socialism in our country, it is necessary t.o- catch up and surpass the -advanced 
countries in both a technical’and an economic respect. Either we achieve this 
or tffey destroy us." (Shaw, D.J.B., 1978). ' In. the next ten years after this 
declaration the USSR underwent a vast industrial expansion; Advances were 
achieved through a system of state planning. As industry and trade were owned 
and controlled by the state, the government was able' to' concentrate men and 
materials on.key'industries. This system enabled the establishment of a power­
ful industry which -formed the backbone of the Soviet Union’s mi 1 itary. strength.
In - the early -1920’s foreign capital was invtted on a limited scale in the form 
of concession grants. To overcome the shortage of trained personnel in this 
period reliance was placed on foreign engineers and technicians - Americans, 
Oermans and some English. At the same time a campaign was launched to increase
the number of technical institutions to increase training of local skilled 
workers. By- the end of the first Five-Year Plan (1928-32) there were reported 
to be some 200 000 students in ^the higher technical colleges and some 900 000 
receiving education in secondary technical schools. Factory schools- handled ':p
about a million workers a year., %
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.The -first- Fyi. Ve~Year Plan (1928-32) assigned a lot of investment to heavy 
industry such as' mining, metallurgical-’industries and construction. In the iron 
and steel industry new blast furnaces brought into operation during this period 
represent a , quarter of,the total number of blast furnaces in operation at .the 
beginning of the period, and nearly two-thirds of their output capacity. In the 
engineering industry nearly half of the machine-tools in'operation in’ 1932 had 
bean installed during, the period of -the first Five-Year - Plan. By the end of the 
first Five-Year Plan period both the, number of workers in industry and the-total 
number of wage - a n d  salary - earners had almost doubled, while the number 
employed in building and construction, was more.than four times what it had been 
in 1928. .
Collectivization of agriculture, the scientific-educational programme,. Lenin's 
"electrification" programme, construction of rai 1 way.s. and canals, imports of 
. foreign capital equipment, .technical personnel and.’strategic raw materials were 
all harnessed primarily‘to bring about industrial development in. the USSR. In 
little more than a decade of the 1930's-, the USSR was changed from a. largely 
agrarian, ' illiterate and militarily disorganized nation into a great industrial 
power.. The period '"from 1928 to the outbreak of the war was. , one of major 
achievement in . terms of 'industrial development and the.range of state control 
was greatly extended. -The techniques of centralized planning- and resource 
. al 1 ocation.-were developed. There was a rise in the Soviet G.N.P. of 11.97. per 
year ' and in the same period the rate of investment was raised from 12.57. to 267. 
of G.N.P. and the output of heavy industry grew "twice as fast as that of light 
industry. There was 1 a rise in the non-agricultural proportion of the- labour 
force from 297.. to 467. and of non-agricultural output from 527 to 697. of total 
output. • - -
The 'initial period of industrialization in the Soviet Union, was also enhanced 
during the 1930's by the fact that much of the Western world was in an economic 
depression. Thus the USSR was able to-import signif icant quanititias of proto­
type equipment and skilled technical know-how at relatively low cost's.
/
Although the industrial development strategy carried out in the first Five-Year 
Plan was quite a success it did very little to distribute industrial activities
throughout the- USSR. It is clear that the basic problem facing the Soviet
government and planning authorities was the fundamental difference between the 
western and .eastern parts of the USSR. -The European part - which is heavily
settled' with: 65-707. of the Soviet population had its resource base, under strain
and many resources showed signs of depletion after centuries of vigorous use.
Stalin's government encouraged a west to east shift of population and industry 
to achieve a balanced and proportional growth of industry. In response to this' 
Awareness from the Second'Five-Year Plan onwards far greater emphasis has been 
placed on industrialization of the Eastern areas of the country. The Soviet 
easterly industrial movement dates from 1930 when the’ decision to build the 
"Ural-Kuzbas Combine" was. made. Involved in this move were the modernized 
resurrection of the Urals.iron industry and the first serious utilization of. the 
greatest Soviet accessible coal reserves in the Kuzbas.
In the Second Five-Year Plan (1.933-37) both a high rate of investment and the 
priority assigned to heavy industry were maintained . Machine-tool production 
was planned to increase nearly two and three-quarter times. In non-ferrous 
metallurgy there , was to be special concentration on developing production "of 
copper, zinc, nickel, tin arid aluminium, 'Transport improvements especially 
railway were-carried out. Production of -pig-iron-showed marked improvement; 
the 1937 .output being more than double that of A  932. The motor-car industry
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fulfilled it's target of an eight-fold inci ease. The- industry .as a 
registered a three-fold rise of output.
In the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-42) transport systems, both rail and water 
received special attention.. This period- was disturbed by the German invasion 
during the Second- World War. There was eastward evacuation of Soviet industry 
from threatened'industrial districts of the west. A few months after the German 
attack in June 1941, more than 1360 major industrial enterprises, mainly- of 
military significance were moved from European Russia and the Ukraine into' the 
eastern regions"of the country. These hastily relocated industries remained in 
.the eastern regions, after the war and new industries were added to them. At the. 
same time existing.plants and industries of these eastern regions were expanded 
at impressive speed.. By 1945, Siberia accounted for 12% of the Soviet Union’s 
gross industrial output.- - .
The three pre-war plans, (192S-32, 1933-37 and. 193S-42) were all designed to 
make the USSR a strategic, self-contained -economy, with emphasis on capital-, 
.goods production. The first Five-Year Plan emphasised expansion in the Moscow 
and Donbas areas, the Second the Ural and Kuzbas as well and the Third went into 
the eastward bound shift of people and industry. These three plans" converted 
the country'from a chaotic backward, state in -which 78% of the population were 
peasants into a major industrial power capable of defeating Nazi Germany in the 
war. To a - certain extent the war helped industrial development in bringing 
about industrial relocation that the Soviet policy before the war had been 
unable to do.
In the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) investment priority was to remain, with 
heavy industry. Special emphasis- was l-aid upon restoration of ‘industry in the 
older industrial centres of the west and south-east. Electricity production was 
to double. Although the period (1937-48) was ,of industrial retardation and 
retrogression after ' 1948 industrial production received a boom, From 1948 
through the first half 'of the 1950’ s Soviet i ndustr i al i z-at i on proceeded at a 
high pace.spurred onward by extreme needs for all sorts of industrial goods and 
guided by the simple principle of producing the utmost. The output of industry 
as a whole was raised by 1950, to 23% above the pre-war level and 73% above the 
1940 level, During the late 1950’s industrial expansion began to slow down as 
needs became less acute and the economy became much more complex.
For the -period 1937-53 the Soviet economy grew at 3.5% per annum and - output per 
head at -3.4%. In the Stalin era the output of the economy was trebled-, the 
state achieved ownership and- control of all means of production and the'distrib­
ution of resources was drastically shifted to provide for a very high level of.- 
investment which was the key to growth.
In the •Fifth • Five-Year Plan (1951-55) Siberia’s-share in capital investment 
declined by-almost 2% but it began" to rise, though slowly,, after the completion, 
of the reconstruction process. In other parts,*sf the country especially Central 
Asia the Soviet government .aimed at. increasing industrial production by 72% 
above the 1950 level. There was also a desire to narrow the gap between indust­
ries producing capital goods' and those producing consumer goods. .The output of 
the former was to grow by 80% and the latter by 65% per annum, but previously 
the former grew about twice as fast as the latter..
As pointed out in the official directives, "The main task of the Sixth Five-Year 
Plan for the development of the Soviet State economy for the period (1956-60) is 
the further intensive development of all. branches of the economy based primarily 
on the growth of heavy- industry'1 (Cressay, G.B. 1962), ' The goals of this plan 
like those of its predecessors were to give- a balanced attention t.o all parts of
the country including the once- neglected' outlying areas of the ea = ? 1 an
proposed to double industrial production and increase rail-freight by one-third. 
To achieve, -its goals 40% of the capital input was to be devoted to the un­
developed . eastern • region's. It was hoped that at the. end of the period- this 
eastern area would produce 50% of the coal, 30% 'of the oil, 46X .of the elec­
tricity, 48% of the steal and 45% of the lumber and forest, products,
At. the.end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1961-65) reorganisation'of industrial 
. administration along regional lines, begun if, 1957 wasNabandoned. The table 
below shows the growth of Soviet B.N.P. between the Fifth and, the Seventh Five- 
Year Plans.
Table 1 Growth of Soviet Oi._N._F.. A 1?1Q-1965)_.
(Using Moorsteen and Powell's weights)
1950 1955 1965
AGRICULTURE 100 126 171
NON-AGRICULTURE 100 153.8. 288. 1
TOTAL G.N.P.- 100' 147.4 . 260.8
Source; Maddison, 1969.
The Eighth Five-Year Plan stated that 70%- of new^industrial development capital 
was to .go to small and medium-sized towns In tfoe European part of the country.. 
In spite of’this renewed emphasis on the industries in old established areas,- 
new industrial■areas emerged in the east. This was in response to the develop­
ment- of huge energy resources, for instance the building of a. hydro-electric 
power station,in eastern Siberia between the Yenisey River and Lake Baykal.
At the .• end of .the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the Eastern parts of-the USSR (Urals, 
Central Asian Republics, Siberia and the Far East) accounted'for 51% of all the 
coal production, 25% of the crude oil, -37% of. the pig-iron, 41% of steel and 41% 
of^'the electrical energy produced, but they had only 35% of the Soviet pop­
ulation. , v ^
In the Ninth Five-Year Flan (1971-7 
of growth in industry. They did not 
few, especially .in Central' Asia 
industrial output in percentage of
'5) all.- republics achieved respectable' rates 
., however; all reach their plan targets but a 
almost marie -it. Table 2 below shows the 
increase in Central Asian republics during
this period (1971-75)»
Table 2: Industrial Output Increase in 7.
'
Plan Actu
U. S.S.R, . 4 7 43
Kasakh S.S.R. 59 ' 42.:
Uzbek S.S.R. 51 51
Kirgiz S.SsR. . 55v 52
Tadzhik S.S.R, 38 .38
Turkmen S.S.R. 64 55.'
Source; Shaw and Davies 19-78.
In the. Tenth Five-Year PI an .(1976-80),three quarters of' the•investment in the 
non— ferrous . metal s • industry was to be devoted to 'developing the- raw 'material- 
base, • and prospecting for 'extra resources was to. be stepped up especially ' irv 
East Kazakstan * the Balkhash.area and South Kazakhstan. . Table 3 • shows the 
targets c?t industrial output increase in. the period (197&r8G) in the USSR and in ■ 
■four republics of Central. Asia.- ■ ■ ' • ,\ '4 ' . ; j
Tabl_e 3 r Tenth Five-Year Flan 1 19Z6-80-).- Industr i_ai Output Jar get ' ?
. ' (Increase in %)• " 7 ■ '
 ^U.S.S.R. 35 — 70 ‘t•_* / - /B
-Kasakh S . S «R . TO _ 43 7.
"Kirgiz S.S.R. TTj — 37 7.
Tadzhik S.’S-.R. 38 » 42 7.
-'."^Turkmen-S.S.R."• 30 - 34' 7.
Source:. Fravdar March, I976«
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY (1940-1960) 
Index (1940-1960)
1^ 888?^
100 - 600 600 - 1000 Over 1000
Blank areas indicate no appreciable industrial growth 
Source: Hposon, 1964. \
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The map shows the shift of industrial concentration and growth from the west to 
Central Asia, a move most of the five-year plans took or planned to take.
Throughout the Soviet period there has'been an unusually heavy emphasis on the 
metallurgical industries and'on capital goods as compared with light industry.
To date a good deal of Soviet scientific research has been devoted to the most 
advanced technology in order to explore and exploit the vast -resources of the 
East. . In atomic and- space research the USSR is among the leading nations. 
However, the formulation and effecting of the changes that occurred in indust­
rial .development strategy in the last sixty years in the USSR are attributable 
to the successive Five-Year Plans adopted by. tl^ e USSR since 1928.
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